WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984
by Raymond Brastow and David Rystrom* provisions that were both favorable and unfavor able to drug producers; therefore, the expected net impact upon drug producing firms was not immediately clear. This paper examines the impact of this change in government regulation by examining stock prices of drug firms around the time of the legislative discussion of the bill in the summer of 1984. Using daily stock returns, we find a significant increase in stock prices of firms primarily engaged in the manufacture of generic drugs. We find no significant impact on prices of firms engaged in the manufacture of already existing, brand name drugs. Thus, the Act appears to have produced net benefits to the drug industry.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the historical background to the legislation and the sequence of events leading to the passage of the law. Section 3 discusses the economic significance of the law and describes the hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology of the study. Section 5 presents the results and their interpre tation, and Section 6 summarizes the findings. 
Congressional Action on

Economic Implications and Hypotheses
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 was a compromise bill which conferred benefits to manufacturers of both brand-name and generic drugs. The major provision of an abbreviated approval process for generic drugs was clearly of benefit to generic drug producers; generic drugs could be brought to market considerably sooner and at lower cost than under the previous law. However, this benefit may have been partially or completely offset by provisions protecting brand-name firms that extended patent lengths and granted in creased protection to new unpatented drugs, thus delaying the potential introduction of generic competitors in the future. Since in an efficient stock market stock prices reflect the market's expectation of the future profitability of a firm, the market's assessment of the expected impact of a new law can be examined by observing changes in stock prices associated with times of legislative action on the bill. By analyzing daily stock prices we examine the hypothesis that investors viewed the legisla tion to be on balance a net benefit to the generic industry. Formally, we perform a test for the null hypothesis that there was no impact on share prices from the legislation. Similarly, we also examine the expected effect of the bill on brand-name producers by examining the behav ior of the stock prices of those firms. 
Data and Methodology
We first examine the stock prices of the five publicly traded firms primarily engaged in the man ufacture of generic drugs: Bolar Pharmaceutical, Lyphomed, Mylan Labs, Par Pharmaceutical, and we used daily closing prices in the analysis. Brown and Warner (1980 , 1985 ), Dann 61 (1980 , and others have demonstrated that the tests using "raw" returns, mean adjusted returns, market adjusted returns, or risk adjusted returns produce results that are quite similar, especially when daily returns are analyzed.
Adjusting returns for risk has little or no impact on results or power of tests when daily returns are used. We report our results in terms of market adjusted returns in order to demonstrate the magnitude of the "abnormal" portion of the impact, but the significance of our results was unchanged when we examined raw returns and mean adjusted returns.5 s(l + l/n)1/2 where: Rp = the daily portfolio return on day 0 Re = the mean portfolio return during the control period, 0.26% for generics and 0.08% for brand-names s = the sample standard deviation of the time series of the portfolio returns during the control period, 1.26% for generics and 0.62% for brand-names n = the number of observations in the control period, n= 100 * Significant at the 5% level.
Empirical Results
brand-name firms for the dates examined in Table  3 is approximately zero. Therefore, an appropriate conclusion may be that the passage of the Act had no net impact on brand-name firms.
Our hypothesis is that there was a significant impact upon drug manufacturers' stock prices at the time that the market judged passage of the bill to be likely. We have focused our study on the dates of August 8 and August 10, but there is obviously some difficulty in determining the appropriate dates to be examined for any event of this kind; the market is constantly reassessing the probability of a bill's passage throughout the legislative process, so the total impact of the law on stock prices may be spread over several days of legislative events. (Schwert (1981) reviews the application and difficulties of using stock market data to assess the impact of legislative actions.)
Since there are several dates in 1984 on which there was legislative action on the event (Table   1) , we also examine the returns associated with those dates. Table 4 presents the market adjusted returns for 3 trading days surrounding each event date described in Table  1 . We include the trading day prior to the event, the event date, and the day after the event in our analysis because of the uncertainty about the exact time of the market's first receipt of the information.
We also calculate the mean 3-day return and a t statistic to test the hypothesis that the mean market adjusted return over the 3-day period is significantly different from the mean market adjusted return for the comparison period.7 For generic firms, we observe that only the three-day periods are overlapping, we cannot reject the hypothesis that both events jointly produced the abnormal returns associated with the two dates. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that passage of the bill increased the wealth of shareholders of generic drug firms.
For brand-name firms, no mean returns are significant for any of the legislative events. This result indicates that the Act had no significant effect on the value of the brand-name firms. This result is not surprising as all of these companies are large and diversified; thus the impact on any single product could be small relative to the rest of a firm's product lines. Any economic effect from the Act could easily be too small to be observed in the firm's stock prices.
Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that the compromise drug legislation of 1984 increased the wealth of shareholders in generic drug manufacturing firms; the market evaluated the compromises [\na + nc-2/\na nJJ where: Rp3 = mean portfolio market adjusted return over 3 days Re = the mean portfolio market adjusted return during the control period sa = the sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns over the 3 day announce ment period sc = the sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns during the control period na = the number of observations in the announcement period, na = 3 nc = the number of observations in the control period, nc= 100 * significant at the 5% level # July 28, the date the bill was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee was a Saturday. We use July 30, the first trading day following the event, as day 0. incorporated in the bill as producing expected net benefits to the generic industry.8 In addition, we conclude that the major part of the impact of the bill was capitalized into share prices in the four days surrounding the date of its passage in the 1984 annual report of each company began with a description and discussion of the firm's major prescription drugs. In some annual reports, the 1984 Act was noted as a potential negative factor for the firm's future sales. We also found some additional evidence that potential loss of sales to a generic competitor is a significant, wealth-reducing event to a large brand-name producer. On July 10, 1984, the Food and Drug Administration approved a generic substitute (produced by a nonpublicly traded firm) for a Merck product, Aldemet, a popular drug for the treatment of high blood pressure. Merck's stock fell 45/8 point on the day of the announce ment, a negative return of 5.1% for one day. This event, which was not directly related to legislative activity about the 1984 Act, provides some preliminary evidence that an event that increases the probability of generic competition is poten tially significant, even to a large diversified firm. 5. We also estimated a Beta coefficient for each portfolio using daily returns from the comparison period. The estimated Beta was .63 for generic firms and .88 for brand-name firms (each statistically significant at the 1% level), indicating that these firms had relatively low levels of systematic risk. We did not risk adjust our returns because of the well-known measurement prob lems with Betas and the unlikelihood of risk adjusted returns affecting any results when daily data is analyzed.
6. The t-statistic is distributed Student-t under the assumption that portfolio daily returns are inde pendent, identically distributed, and normal.
Where the sample size is large, as here, the test statistic is approximately normal. See Dann (1981) , Fama (1976) , and Brown and Warner (1985) for a discussion of this test and evidence about distributions of daily returns. 7. For a discussion of this test, see Dann (1981) . Leftwich (1981) performs a test for multi-day announcement period returns based on cumulative returns over the announcement period. The test are approximately equivalent. 8. Whether the bill benefited consumers is unre solved by our analysis. The expectation that the generic industry would become more profitable does not necessarily imply that consumers would be expected to gain. Consumer interest groups lobbied for the bill in Congress, presumably because they expected greater availability of generic substitutes to result in savings for consumers. However, welfare implications for consumers hinge on the acceptance by consumers of generic versions of brand-name drugs and on the price response by brand-name producers. If consumers are reluctant to purchase generic drugs, perhaps due to the cost of acquiring information about their quality, and brand-name firms increase their prices in response to generic competition then consumers in the aggregate may suffer a welfare loss. See Leffler (1981) for a discussion of the issues involved in new product entry to drug markets.
